Here's something I've been working out as I lay down and try to go to sleep at night, it has been a remarkably good cure for insomnia. This will probably end up being a pretty long and, for most people, uninteresting post- just so you're warned.
I'd like to discuss a little bit the ontological argument for God. Now before you go, "Whaaa??" and click away, let me explain what it is in a nutshell. The argument, first put forward by
St. Anselm, is basically:
1. We can conceive of perfection (or that which no greater can be thought)
2. This perfection is an attribute of God.
3. Part of this perfection is existence (because existence is good)
4 God exists.
This idea has been poo-pooed by various philosophers ever since it was first published, including by this fellow
Gaunilo of Marmoutiers, a Benedictine monk more popularly known as the "Island Guy". His refutation was basically that he could conceive of a perfect island, the existence of this island was part of its perfection, so the perfect island must exist, right? I'll be honest, the ontological argument just doesn't "do it" for me; if true, the argument only gets us to some vague philosophical conception of God, like Aristotle's
Unmoved Mover, not necessarily Yahweh, much less addressing the truth of the Resurrection. But, all that said, I've never felt the isalnd think really cut it as a refutation. Thats right, this blog is about to weigh in on philosophical controversies from the 11th century. I can feel my readership exploding as I type; it don't get no more relevant than this.
The problem with the island is that an island can not be judged in the same terms as a being. We can discuss rational beings in terms of their ethical/religious character an evaluate them on such terms. One island, however can not be said to be morally superior to another (well I mean you could, it just wouldn't make sense). The island or anything else without rational intellect (a dog for example), can only be judged on aesthetic or utilitarian terms- it's beautiful, trashy, it has resources we can use, ect. and affirmed as
good in it's
createdness (but this is an act of faith rather than a philosophical position). It does not make sense to talk of it's perfection because any perfection would be aesthetic one. I don't know that we can speak of aesthetic perfection, because an aesthetic judgment is necessarily subjective, rely both on the object being considered and the observer. For example a perfect engine may need to be frictionless (for maximum efficency, which would ostensibly be part of its perfection) but the perfect tire obviously would not be frictionless as it must grip the road. The tire's (and the road's) "imperfections" that cause friction are in fact a function of it's usefulness.
Plato believed that there was a realm of ideas which was superior to the material plane, so that we could judge say, a desk, based on the extent to which it conform to the ideal standard of desks that exists in the realm of ideas. This system of thought influenced the
Gnostic heresy, that plagued early Christianity (and I think still infects a lot of Christian circles today, but that is another post), basically that matter was bad and spirit good, which at it's far end led to the belief that Christ could not have become incarnate, but instead only appeared to be. I say all that to show clearly what dangerous ground I am on here when I say that we cannot, I do not think, conceive of perfection in material terms. Two reasons for this, first because materiality implies some sort of aesthetic judgment as part of its perfection, and second because of the corruptibility of the flesh, because of its susceptibility to death. So, before the question is asked, this means that we cannot I think talk about Jesus as being perfect
as touches His manhood. This is a part of what the
poem in Phil. 2 is talking about when it says He emptied Himself, He took on the frailties of man including death. This is why as Kierkegaard says, we cannot argue from the greatness of Christ or the effects of His life that He is God. There is, as he says,
an infinite qualitative distinction between man and God, which is a technical way of saying that man does not exist on a continuum with God; God is essentially different than man. Which brings me nicely back around to the point I made at the outset, we cannot make an argument for God that is meaningful ultimately; faith requires an act of faith, not argumentation.
As a little postlude here, I do want to leave open the possibility for material perfection in the finally redeemed Creation. The Resurrected Christ was an anticipation of what is to come when, "
God's dwelling place is with man". Now we don't really know exactly what it will be like, but then we could perhaps speak of
perfections, because the diversity which God has created and so deemed good will certainly still be in place I would think. I'm totally stealing this from somewhere in the writings of Lewis, but I forget where precisely, so I'll just roll with. Goodness expresses itself in diversity, while evil is always monotonously the same. The remarkable variety of the saints when contrasted to the how incredibly similar evil men are in the end, is a case in point. N.T. Wright has some good stuff about this, and I found a pretty solid (at least based on my skimming of it) summary of some of the main points of his book
Suprised by Hope here on the Relevant magazine website (but you should still read the book).
I'll end with a few lines from W.H. Auden that sum up my feelings about arguments for the existence of God.
And must put up with having learned
All proofs or disproofs that we tender
Of His existence are returned
Unopened to the sender.
-Friday's Child, W.H. Auden